"Veto Players, Policy Change, and Institutional Design," with Tiberiu Dragu. Forthcoming in Research and Politics.
"Access to Justice in Revenue-Seeking Legal Institutions." (Appendix)
“Justice for Sale: State Revenue Collection and the Development of a Legal System." (Supplementary)
“The Birth of Pork: Local Federal Projects and the Construction of Legislative Majorities, 1791-1860,” with Sanford Gordon. R&R at the American Political Science Review.
Research in Progress
“When do Citizens Seek Private Enforcement? Evidence from the London Islamic Sharia Council.”
Abstract: Why do members of poor social groups access private enforcement mechanisms, such as tribal or religious councils, instead of the state legal system? Are their choices driven by ideological preferences, or by material considerations such as the relative costliness and effectiveness of each institution? To answer this question, I construct an original dataset of 246 (anonymized) divorce cases adjudicated by the London Islamic Sharia Council, one of the largest and oldest informal Islamic adjudication mechanisms operating in the U.K., between November, 1997 and April, 2001. By combining these data with similar data over the same period from the U.K.'s county court system, and studying the differential effects of economic and political shocks on patterns in the divorce petitions received by each legal institution, I aim to measure the relative effects of ideology and cost concerns on litigants' choice between these two systems of adjudication. I supplement my quantitative analysis with qualitative interviews conducted with the leaders of two Sharia Councils: the Islamic Sharia Council and the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal located in Nuneaton, England.
“The Inefficiency of Justice: Allocative Distortions and "Effective" Property Rights Regimes,” with Catherine Hafer.
Abstract: The roles of market transaction costs and inadequate property rights protections in the (in)efficient allocation of resources are well-known. However, there is little scholarship on the allocative distortions inherently generated even by relatively effective property rights institutions. We show that these distortions emerge because property regimes both allocate rights and decide the means by which these rights may be secured through the legal system. Just as different people can obtain different income streams from the same property because of differences in their personal attributes (time, skill, judgment, money, risk preferences), so will different means of determining the outcomes of disputes call on different human attributes. As a result, different individuals will face different effective costs of securing property rights. Unless the legal system is structured so that these differences in cost correspond exactly to the degree to which individuals possess the attributes necessary to use property efficiently, efficient resource allocation may not occur. We examine the kinds of distortions different enforcement mechanisms generate, explore various possible solutions to this problem, and discuss their limitations.